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Abstract
As a conceptual background typical types of minorities and typical sources of
minority conflict are outlined. A historical overview is given of the problems
Niger Delta minorities have been experiencing. Their grievances and
demands are highlighted, and the responses of different Nigerian governments
are discussed. As a conclusion a possible way forward is recommended, one
which would take seriously the possibilities of decentralising and of creating a
rewarding involvement for the impatient minorities before it is too late.
Introduction
For a long time, the communities of the Niger Delta have had serious
grievances which have not been well addressed. Foremost is that although the
bulk of crude oil, the country’s main source of revenue, is derived from their
lands, they belonged to the ranks of the most backward, undeveloped and
politically marginalised groups in the country. This has been attributed to the
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aspirations, minorities may be classified or cross-classified into five groups,
namely, ethno-nationalists, indigenous peoples, ethno-classes, militant or
politicised sects and communal contenders (Surr 1993:17).
• Ethno-nationalists are historically autonomous, and often large and
regionally concentrated groups that are committed to achieving or
regaining independent statehood. Examples include the Quebecois
(Canada), the Kurds (Iraq and Iran) and the Basques (Spain and France).
• Indigenous peoples are politically conquered, culturally isolated, ecologi-
cally endangered and/or economically vulnerable descendants of the
original inhabitants of a region. Native Americans, Australian Aborigines
and the ethno-nationalistic Kurds are examples of indigenous peoples.
• Ethno-classes are usually descendants of slaves or immigrants who play
distinct, and socially inferior or politically vulnerable, economic roles.
Examples of ethno-classes include blacks in the Americas and Britain,
Koreans in Japan, the Chinese in Malaysia and the residual European and
Asian minorities in Eastern and Southern Africa.
• Militant or politicised sects are minority communities that are engaged
primarily in the defence of their religious beliefs. Such communities
include Bosnian Muslims of the former Yugoslavia, Arabs in Israel, the
Catholics in Northern Ireland and the Kashmiris and Sikhs in India.
• Communal contenders are culturally distinct groups in heterogeneous
societies in which no single group constitutes a demographic majority of
the population or in which all groups are, strictly speaking, minorities. In
societies dominated by communal contenders, there is a general accep-
tance of the moral equivalence of all groups, all communities seek or hold
a significant share in state power, and political power at the centre is often
based on fluid or unstable inter-ethnic coalition. Most African countries,
including Nigeria, are dominated by communal contenders.
What are the sources of the recent ethnic minority upheavals in Nigeria and
other deeply divided societies?
In the first place, recent trends in global politics have contributed directly
to the primacy, escalation, proliferation, diffusion or contagion of communal
and ethnic nationality conflict. In the words of one observer:
The collapse of communism, the ensuing upsurge of nationalist conflict in
Eastern Europe, and the increasing visibility of recession in the west,




fact that they are minorities. They accuse the major ethnic groups of using oil
wealth to develop their areas at the expense of the areas from which oil is
derived. Another is that several years of oil exploration and the hazards of
spillage and gas flaring which accompany it have degraded their environ-
ments, and left their communities desolate. Not only have farming and
fishing, the main occupations of the mostly riverine minorities been deci-
mated, but their territories have continuously lacked basic infrastructure and
amenities, such as electricity, roads, schools, hospitals and potable water.
These grievances have been directed against both the state and the oil
companies, which have been accused of contributing too little in return for
the huge profit they get from oil exploration.
This paper is to highlight the ongoing ethnic minority conflict in Nigeria’s
Niger Delta. The analysis is developed in five broad segments: the first
section will provide a conceptual background to the study; the second offers a
brief historical overview of ethnic minority problems and politics in Nigeria;
the third and fourth sections document the conditions and consequences of
the recent uprisings in the Niger Delta, while the final section delineates the
study’s central conclusions, implications or recommendations.
1. Conceptual Discourse
Minority group conflict constitutes the core of ethnic turbulence and violence
worldwide. But in certain cases, defining minorities, or even ethnicity, is
virtually an intractable task. In a definition that adequately encapsulates the
critical, numerical and relational properties of the concept, a United Nations
source describes minorities as groups that:
… are numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a
non-dominant position, whose members possess ethnic, religious or
linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of the population, and
who have, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity directed towards
preserving their culture (resources), tradition, religion or languages.
(Thornberry 1980:257)
Thus in this study, minorities are considered to be culturally distinctive and
relatively cohesive groups which occupy a position of numerical inferiority
and actual or potential socio-political subordination vis-à-vis other cultural
sections in a political community. 
Depending on their objectives, socio-economic condition, and/or political
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Democracy can be an element in the successful resolution of ethnic
minority grievances because it provides representation for various opin-
ions through multiparty competition. Even though an aggrieved group is
not in charge of governance ... it can make its voice heard through repre-
sentatives in coalition or even in the opposition.
Devolution, which is commonly regarded as the territorial twin of democracy,
provides some security for minorities through arrangements for local or
regional self-governance and autonomy. These arrangements differ in the
extent of autonomy devolved to ethnic minorities. The most common devolu-
tionary mechanisms include confederalism, federalism, regional autonomism,
regional administrative decentralisation and community autonomism.
To the long suffering marginalised peoples of the Niger Delta, majori-
tarian democracy and years of military misrule have failed them, so also has
the so-called devolution by creating numerous local government areas. The
only meaningful option that has never been advocated is that of making the
peoples of the Niger Delta stake-holders in the oil industry, so that they could
have a sense of belonging, and could benefit from an industry and a nation
that for more than three decades of independence have treated them as
second class citizens
2. Historical overview
Nigeria became independent in October 1960 with a federal system, designed
by the colonial ruler, which from the very beginning was at variance with the
aspirations of many of the minorities in the country. The federal constitution
that was produced suffered from two fundamental and destabilising flaws.
The first was the division of the country into three unequal regions, with the
population and size of the northern region alone exceeding that of the two
southern regions put together. The second flaw involved the political and
demographic domination of the northern, western, and eastern regions by the
Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo majority nationalities respectively, and the
attendant marginalisation of the over 200 ethnic minorities that comprise
approximately one-third of the population of each region (Okpu 1977:128).
In essence the flawed, tripartite federal structure transformed the
country’s multipolar ethnic configuration, in which no single group consti-
tutes a majority of the total national population, into a regional and ethnically
skewed system, in which each region was polarised into majority and minority
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Secondly, the centralising project of state consolidation or nation building
in many plural societies has almost inevitably involved the cultural devalua-
tion, political repression and/or economic expropriation of the more
vulnerable geo-ethnic segment of the political community. In Nigeria, for
instance, the entire project of national politico-economic development has,
since the seventies, been based on the massive centralisation and transfer of
revenue derived from a few oil-rich, but ecologically endangered communi-
ties in the Niger Delta to other parts of the federation. In a global, moral and
intellectual milieu that has become very sensitive to abuses of group and
individual rights and other excesses of centralised states, such centrist state-
building strategies and processes have invariably provoked both domestic
communal rebellion and international stricture (Wunsch & Olowu 1990:218).
Third, in culturally fragmented communities, group identity exerts a
powerful and autonomous emotional, psychological or consummatory role. In
the words of Donald Horowitz (1993:23):
Ethnic affiliations provide a sense of trust, certainty, reciprocal help, and
protection.
In all deeply divided societies, such ethnic affiliations have naturally
acquired greater salience and attraction as groups have increasingly found it
necessary to mobilise against historic and contemporary inequities and injus-
tices in the socio-political process of heterogeneous states.
Fourthly, especially in the economically under-developed countries of the
Third World, ethnic minority grievances have been ignited by competition for
and by real or perceived discrimination in the allocation of such valued but
increasingly scarce benefits of modernity as roads, clinics, schools, jobs and
related distributive opportunities. As Robert Bates has shown, resource
competition in Africa animates or exacerbates ethnic conflict because ethno-
territorial constituencies or areas are the key prospective beneficiaries of
state allocation decisions, because sectionally-based local or regional admin-
istration constitutes an important agency for the distribution of economic
benefits, and because rival sectional elites find it expedient to mobilise
ethnic solidarities in their competition for power and privilege (Robert
1983:219).
What then are some of the appropriate institutional mechanisms or policy
responses for the mediation of ethnic conflict? In the past, generalised
concepts of democracy, devolution and power sharing were regarded as the
three major institutional paradigms of ethnic conflict management. According
to William Zartman (1993:327):
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Gowon Administration (1966-1975) and the Murtala Mohammed-Obasanjo
Government (1975-1979) progressively de-emphasised the long-standing
principle of allocation by regional derivation in the distribution of centrally
collected revenues. Instead these revenues were distributed on the basis of
population and inter-state equality. Consequently, whereas the old regions
were the primary beneficiaries of commodity export revenues in the fifties
and sixties, the new oil rich states were denied the export revenues derived
from their territories by the centre. For instance, while in March 1969 50% of
both off-shore and on-shore mining rents and royalties were allocated to the
state from where they had been derived, by March 1979 only 20% of on-shore
mining rents and royalties were allocated on a derivation basis. Indeed, in the
final six months of the first Obasanjo government the derivation principle was
expunged from Nigeria’s revenue sharing system in line with the recommen-
dation of Professor Ojetunji Aboyade – who, as a Yoruba from the majority
group whose sense of equity is at variance with the demands of the oil
producing minorities, was appointed to head the Technical Committee on
Revenue Allocation.
The state recognition exercise implemented by the Mohammed-Obasanjo
administration in April 1976 further underscored the growing subordination
of ethnic minority to majority interest in the post-civil war period. While
Gowon’s 12-state structure had included at least six ethnic minority states,
the new 19-state structure consisted of a total of 12 ethnic majority-domi-
nated states and only seven minority-controlled states. Indeed, key ethnic
minority-dominated statehood requests for New Cross River, Port Harcourt
and New Kaduna (Zaria) were overlooked in the 1976 exercise, while some of
the homogeneous ethnic majority states were fragmented into two or more
states. This bias in the state creation process underscored the growing official
perception of state administrations primarily as avenues for administrative
devolution and resource distribution to broad population groups, rather than
simply as instruments of ethnic minority autonomy and security.
The return to civilian rule in 1979 did little to enhance the fortunes of
ethnic minority communities. To be sure, the ethnic minorities did in a sense
marginally benefit from – 
• the establishment of an American style presidential system, which
required the president to obtain appreciable electoral support in at least
two-thirds of the states in the federation;
• the introduction of the “Federal character” principle, which required
broad ethnic or inter-state representation in the composition of key
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ethnic blocs, while one region was big enough to dominate the federation.
Although a commission was set up by the colonial administration to look into
the fear of the minorities and to proffer means of allaying such fears, and
although the minority-populated Mid-West region was carried out from the
Yoruba West in 1963, the political aspiration of Nigeria’s minorities for the
security of their own regions or states was not given any real attention until
the collapse of the first Republic in January 1966.
The first thirteen years of military rule that followed the demise of the
First Republic featured several historic and dramatic changes in the nature of
majority-minority relations. First, the suspension of civil-democratic rule led
to the ascendancy of a military-bureaucratic alliance in which ethnic
minority elements were disproportionately represented. With the counter
coup of July 1966, in particular, the reins of power fell directly into the hands
of Yakubu Gowon, an officer from the Angas tribe, an ethnic minority in the
Middle Belt region of Nigeria, who relied heavily for political direction and
policy advice on a group of versatile southern ethnic minority bureaucrats in
the federal civil service among whom was Allison Ayida, P.C. Asiodu and
Eme Ebong. Furthermore, Gowon’s decision to divide the country into 12
states in May 1967 dramatically altered the configuration of the federal struc-
ture and the nature of majority-minority relations. By giving relative
satisfaction to the long-standing ethnic minority demands for new states,
Gowon’s 12 state structure not only overturned the structural hegemony of the
North, but also liberated many minority communities from the regional stran-
glehold of the majority groups and undermined local ethnic minority support
for the secessionist bid of the eastern region (Suberu 1991:499-522).
In addition, the phenomenal expansion during the early seventies in the
volume and prices of Nigeria’s crude oil led to a fundamental geo-political
shift in the economic foundations of the Nigerian state. Henceforth, the pivot
of the Nigerian political economy would cease to revolve around the agricul-
tural export of the ethnic-majority sections. Rather, petroleum export revenue
derived disproportionately from the southern minority states of Rivers,
Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Cross River and Akwa Ibom had become the linchpin of
Nigeria’s economy. This ethno-regional shift in the political economy of the
Nigeria federation appeared to present the prospect of a more visible role for
the ethnic minorities in the politics of the country.
However, post-civil war reforms in revenue allocation, and in the Federal
state structure, operated largely to undermine ethnic minority interests. Thus
reflecting the unitarist and centralising project of military rule, both the
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people have been in the vanguard focusing on the “national question” as a
problem (Osaghae 1991:355).
Notwithstanding the Ogoni uprising which lasted between 1990 and
1993, the Odi direct action of 1998-1999 marked a new phase in the inter-
esting interface of oil and minority Niger Delta politics. Not since the
rebellion of Isaac Adaka Boro, Sam Owunaro and Nottingham Dick, who
declared a short-lived independent Niger-Delta Republic in 1967 over oil
related grievances, has any oil minority community sought redress in ways
which involved mobilised mass action and direct confrontation with the
repressive Nigerian state.
It was in the Ijaw town of Oloibiri in the minority-populated Rivers State
that oil was first discovered in commercial quantities in Nigeria at the second
half of the 1950s. Since then the Niger Delta has produced more than 85% of
commercial oil production in the federation. Accordingly, the area’s diverse
ethnic minority communities have been at the receiving end of the country’s
inequitable distributive politics and revenue sharing policies and have been
in the forefront of the political agitation for the promotion and protection of
the economic and ecological rights of the oil producing areas.
Put precisely, the grievances and demands of the Niger Delta have
involved three closely interrelated, but analytically distinct issues.
• First, those communities contend that mineral land rents, and perhaps oil
royalties, should rightly and naturally belong to the communities or state
of derivation.
• Second, the Niger Delta communities are of the opinion that a significant
proportion of federally collected mineral revenues, including the lucrative
petroleum profit tax, should be returned to the communities of the Niger
Delta in consonance with the principles of derivation.
• Third, the Niger Delta communities contend that appropriate institutional
and financial arrangements should be put in place by the Nigerian state
and oil multinationals to compensate their communities for the develop-
mental and ecological problems associated with mineral exploration and
exploitation.
Indeed, a major feature of recent agitation in the Niger Delta areas, apart from
the kidnapping of expatriate oil company workers and the demand of ransom,
is the repeated invasion and blockading of oil installations. In 1993, for
instance, the operations and installations of Shell were disrupted by about a
hundred communal disturbances, leading to the loss of some 12 million




• the strategic role that was played by ethnic minority constituencies in the
electoral victories of the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN); and
• the commitment of the Shehu Shagari Federal Administration to a partial
restoration of the derivation principle in national revenue sharing (Suberu
1992:29-56).
During the Second Republic, however, several countervailing factors worked
to abort the effective advancement of ethnic minority interests. These
included the NPN’s ethno-regionalist zoning policy (which largely reinforced
the traditional predominance of the three major ethnic groups); the somewhat
centrist revenue sharing policy which prescribed revenue sharing conflicts
between the Federal Government and the oil-rich opposition-controlled then
Bendel State; the political fragmentation of the minorities; and the abrupt
termination of the life of the Second Republic at the end of 1983.
Developments since the reintroduction of military rule in 1984 further
aggravated the stress of Nigeria’s minorities. Contributing to this distress are
such factors as the numerous arbitrary acts of ethnic provocation and reli-
gious partiality by the administration of General Muhammadu Buhari,
Ibrahim Babangida, and Sani Abacha; the deepening economic crisis and
declining political legitimacy of the Nigerian state; the repeated manipulation
and eventual abortion of the programme of transition to the Third Democratic
Nigerian Republic; the accumulated impacts of previous decades of ethnic
minority marginalisation; and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in many
parts of the world. In very few states of the Nigerian Federation have these
latest waves of ethnic minority discontent and distress been more visible and
combustible than in the oil producing Niger Delta.
3. The Niger Delta and Nigeria’s federalism
Demands for more equitable and privileged treatment by oil-producing
minorities of the Niger Delta, as well as struggles by them and other minori-
ties to redress power imbalances in the federation which makes them
internally colonised people, are not new. These demands began during the
agitation for separate states in the 1950s and 1960s, which led to the setting
up of the Minorities Commission in 1956. But they can be traced right down
to attempts by politicians from the minority groups in the Second Republic to
organise to wrest political power from the majority elements. The Niger Delta
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• the strategic role that was played by ethnic minority constituencies in the
electoral victories of the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN); and
• the commitment of the Shehu Shagari Federal Administration to a partial
restoration of the derivation principle in national revenue sharing (Suberu
1992:29-56).
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termination of the life of the Second Republic at the end of 1983.
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Ibrahim Babangida, and Sani Abacha; the deepening economic crisis and
declining political legitimacy of the Nigerian state; the repeated manipulation
and eventual abortion of the programme of transition to the Third Democratic
Nigerian Republic; the accumulated impacts of previous decades of ethnic
minority marginalisation; and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism in many
parts of the world. In very few states of the Nigerian Federation have these
latest waves of ethnic minority discontent and distress been more visible and
combustible than in the oil producing Niger Delta.
3. The Niger Delta and Nigeria’s federalism
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ties to redress power imbalances in the federation which makes them
internally colonised people, are not new. These demands began during the
agitation for separate states in the 1950s and 1960s, which led to the setting
up of the Minorities Commission in 1956. But they can be traced right down
to attempts by politicians from the minority groups in the Second Republic to
organise to wrest political power from the majority elements. The Niger Delta
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problems throughout the federation was increased from 1% to 2% of the
federation account. Fourthly and finally, the military government committed
itself to the establishment of a new national body on environmental issues and
ecological emergencies.
These redistributive concessions to the oil-producing Niger Delta did not
meet the expectations of the various communities. OMPADEC was estab-
lished not to succeed. The chairman of the commission was not answerable to
the various state governments of the Niger Delta. He derives his power from
the President and was answerable to him alone. OMPADEC thus was faced
with many difficulties which reduced the degree of its effectiveness.
OMPADEC was an inappropriate or inadequate response to the yearning of
the Niger Delta people. It was grossly under-funded, politically unrepresenta-
tive and administratively over-centralised.
Reflecting the failure of its redistributive and reorganisational policies,
the Government has increasingly resorted to regulatory and repressive solu-
tions to ethnic minority agitation in the Niger Delta. These “solutions”
included the proscription or banning of ethnic associations; the official decla-
ration of ethnic minority agitations for autonomy as a seditious offence
punishable with the death penalty; the confinement, detention, arbitrary
conviction, imprisonment and/or execution of outspoken ethnic minority
elites; and the violent suppression, usually by military force, of protest and
uprising by ethnic minority communities.
Under Decree 21 of May 1992, for instance, the federal military govern-
ment banned the Association of Minority Oil-producing states, the
Commonwealth of Oil-producing Areas and several other ostensibly parochial
or sectional political associations. In May 1993, the then Military government
announced a Treasonable Offences Law that imposed the death penalty on
advocates of ethnic autonomy who conspire with groups within or outside the
country, and proffer ideas that minimise the sovereignty of Nigeria.
Another obnoxious dimension to the government’s repression of ethnic
minorities has involved the violent military suppression of communal protests
and uprisings. In November 1990, for instance, 20 persons were killed in
Umuchem during disturbances involving the Umuchem indigenes on the one
hand, and Shell and the Nigeria Police on the other. One person was killed
and eleven were injured in the Ogoni village of Biara in April 1993, when the
police opened fire on a group of farmers. The farmers had resisted the instal-
lation of an oil pipeline by agents of the Shell Oil Company. In January 1994,
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been losing about 8,000 barrels of crude oil per day since the Ogoni “rally” of
January 1993. In all the company estimates that over 60% of spills and leak-
ages affecting its installations are caused by acts of sabotage by aggrieved oil
producing ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta (The Guardian 1992, 1994).
4. Government’s response to the demands of 
Niger Delta communities
The government’s response so far to the demands of the Niger Delta people
has been a combination of some carrot and mostly stick, especially during the
period of the Abacha regime. Half-hearted official response has centred
around redistributive reorganisational and repressive measures (Keller
1983:381), while the demands of the Niger Delta people are for economic
restitution and ecological rehabilitation.
For instance, in 1991 the Federal Government tried to address the devel-
opmental problems of the Niger Delta by asking the Nigerian National
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), and multinational oil companies in joint-
venture with it, to allocate 3% of their annual investment in capital projects
to community development programmes in their area of operation. This policy
announcement marked a departure from the previous practice of discre-
tionary and often perfunctory oil company investment and involvement in
community development. But these changes came a little too late (The African
Guardian 1991:35).
In June 1992, the Federal Government announced key revenue sharing
reforms designed to contain the increasing and violent rhetoric emanating
from the Niger Delta. First, federal statutory allocation for the development
and rehabilitation of mineral producing areas was increased from 1.5% to 3%
of federally collected mineral revenues. The oil-producing Niger Delta, on
the other hand, continued to receive 1% of mineral revenues on the basis of
the derivation principle. Second, a twelve-member statutory agency – the Oil
Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), with head-
quarters in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, and offices in eight oil-producing
areas of the Niger Delta – was established to administer the newly expanded
allocation. This put an end to the controversial and ineffectual practice of
disbursing the mineral-producing areas’ fund through ad hoc presidential
committees. Third, the statutory allocation for the amelioration of ecological
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persuasively stated their intentions of redressing the vexed issues raised by
the communities of the Niger Delta, the processes advocated for their redress
is not entirely convincing.
Solving the Delta crisis may prove to be Obasanjo’s most difficult chal-
lenge. Communities living in the Niger Delta have long suffered the dual
attitude of a government indifferent to their developmental needs and an
industry which threatens their traditional livelihood. While oil companies pay
hefty royalties to the Nigerian government for concessions, little of this money
ever makes its way back to the communities where the oil is produced.
After years of fruitless effort to find redress through constitutional
process, the communities have turned their anger against the multinational
companies in their midst. Oil platforms have been raided by “community
activists” and expatriate staff have been held hostage. The government has
responded with repressive crackdowns on local villages.
While Abubakar tried to placate the Delta communities with offers of a
greater share of the federally collected oil rents, it is argued that the only
solution is to make the communities “stake-holders” in the oil industry.
Despite making the right noises, peoples in the Niger Delta communities are
sceptical about Obasanjo’s commitment, which they see as too little too late.
Some argue that the crisis began in the late 1970s under the first Obasanjo
government when many powers were stripped from local council and ceded to
the central government. Many fear that Obasanjo will rely on centrally driven
efforts to buy off local leaders or military measures to snuff out the rebellion
rather than seeking a viable long-term solution through constitutional reform.
But these are different times and such measures might only push the commu-
nities of the Niger Delta to adopt extreme counter measures.
Endnote
1 Dr. Quaker-Dokubo obtained his Ph.D. in Nuclear Proliferation from the University of
Bradford, and is currently a Research Fellow of the Nigerian Institute of International
Affairs, and a Member of the Negotiation and Conflict Management Group.
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law enforcement agents disrupted virtually all the activities that the Ogoni
people had put in place to mark the first anniversary of the Ogoni National
Day Rally.
5. Which way forward? 
An important requirement for ethnic equity and justice in Nigeria is a process
that would slowly but surely decentralise the control of power and resources
away from the centre to the various levels of government. Such a process
would involve the recognition of the rights of oil-producing communities of
the Niger Delta so that they could control and use a significant proportion of
the wealth derived from their territories. A significant move in this direction
was the decision of the 1994-95 National Constitutional Conference to
propose the allocation of not less than 13% (as opposed to the current 3-4%)
of mineral revenue to the oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta.
Finally, since policies of reorganisation and half-hearted attempts at re-
adjusting revenue allocation had met with failure, the only way forward is to
make the Niger Delta communities “stake-holders” in the oil economy of the
country. Stake holding is not aimed at dispensing hand-outs to those commu-
nities, but at allocating an appreciable percentage of revenue on a particular
oil well to be managed by the people, so that proceeds or dividends will come
straight to the community’s “Oil Company”. If the communities have a stake
in the oil exploited from their communities – in which they have invested, in
some cases with foreign capital – the recurrent problem of hostage taking,
raiding of oil platforms and the sabotaging of oil pipelines will be a thing of
the past. “Stake holding” will redress most of the issues of marginalisation
and deprivation and give a sense of belonging to the communities of the 
Niger Delta, so that the goose that lay the golden egg could at least benefit
from the egg.
The Ogoni uprising and the Odi direct action of the last decade of the
1990s formed a significant landmark in the struggle by Niger Delta communi-
ties to enjoy greater benefits from their exploited resources and to redress
their marginalisation from state power. It is however not an isolated episode,
but a wider awakening of the communities in the Niger Delta to a vigorous
challenge of the over-centralisation of state power that also raised funda-
mental questions on the role of the minorities and the basis of the Nigerian
federation on the political agenda. Although the Obasanjo administration has
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